

Remark 1. It is well to look through Searle's and Austin's selections before approaching this paper.

MEANING, FORCE, UPTAKE. Strawson begins by distinguishing Austin's meaning of an utterance from its force. 'Meaning' here is associated with the locutionary act. Even if we know the meaning of the utterance, there is a further question *how* the utterance was meant, or how the utterance was supposed to be taken. This is what Austin meant by 'securing an uptake' of an utterance—namely, that 'the message has been received'. Securing an uptake is the question of illocutionary force. Illocutionary acts are characterised by their force. It seems that illocutionary force uniquely characterises illocutionary acts. Still, there may be cases where the two notions, 'illocutionary force' and 'illocutionary act', come apart.

Example 2. Suppose I am a priest about to marry the two of you. I am supposed to say something like:

I hereby pronounce you man and wife.

But both of you are a bit deaf, and I have lost my voice. So I am just murmuring these words, and you can't hear. So my utterance has the force of marriage-declaration, yet at the same time (one might argue) no declaration has *actually* been performed.

Furthermore, Austin claimed, illocutionary force is determined by conventions. In that it is sharply distinguished from perlocutionary effects that track no conventions in particular.

THE ROLE OF CONVENTION. The uninteresting claim about convention would be that to produce *any* speech act requires exploiting a linguistic convention. The interesting claim is that the force is itself, whenever it is not exhausted by the (locutionary) meaning, is also determined by convention.

Strawson admits that this kind of thesis holds in a number of cases (jury, umpire). Those are precisely the cases that impressed Austin. But in other cases this cannot be so.

Example 3 (Directives). Suppose I utter, 'Don't go.' Is my utterance an order, request, or entreaty? This very much depends on the speaker's situation, his attitude toward the hearer, manner, intonation—and the intention. However, the situation would have been different, had I uttered 'I entreaty you not to go.' Even here, though, you could say that a possibility of order is not out of question. But that would require a non-literal use of the words, a mock utterance. This way of using words is foreclosed by Strawson from the beginning.

Quite generally, to suppose that there is always a convention governing the determination of illocutionary force is like supposing, absurdly, that every love affair should follow the conventions of chivalric love laid out in the *Roman de la Rose* and so forth.

GRICEAN INTENTIONS. The approach naturally suited to deal with non-conventional illocutionary acts should use the Gricean notion of nonnatural meaning. Nonnatural meaning satisfies three conditions:

- i_1 by uttering x , S intends to produce a response r in A ;
- i_2 S intends A to recognise i_1 ;
- i_3 S intends the recognition in i_2 to be at least part of the reason for A to deliver r .

Gricean intentions are geared towards describing the conditions of communication. Absent these intentions, as with the case of natural meaning, there is no communication (even if there are behavioural regularities). But now, Strawson argues, we can describe a situation in which all the conditions are satisfied, but where no communication takes place (or so it seems). In fact, this situation is just a variation of Grice's original examples.

Example 4 (Spying). The British counter-intelligence officer Paul wishes to lay a trap for the German undercover spy Ludwig. So at a party Paul says to his fellow officer Peter:

(20-1) The sea convoy will deploy on 1 January.

Paul wishes Ludwig to believe that the convoy will deploy on 01/01 (in fact it will deploy on 02/01). He makes sure that Ludwig overhears the utterance (20-1). Indeed, Ludwig overhears the utterance, just as Paul intended. Ludwig himself is not party to the conversation. But of course, Paul intends Ludwig to recognise the intention of instilling in Ludwig the belief expressed in (20-1). This simply means that Ludwig understands the utterance (20-1) as an English literal utterance, and that Ludwig generally takes Paul to be competent and trustworthy. And of course, these understandings are intended by Paul to be at least one reason for Ludwig's subsequent response, such as a report to the German high command. So Paul's utterance (20-1) satisfies all three of Grice's conditions. Yet it does not seem that Paul is telling Ludwig anything at all (though he may be saying something to Peter).

Question 5. Verify that Paul's utterance satisfies all three of Grice's conditions.

Question 6. What, if anything, would have changed in the example if Paul was talking to *Ludwig* and uttering (20-1)?

In the light of this example Strawson suggests amending Grice's account with another condition:

i_4 S intends A to recognise i_2 .

In simple words, the hearer must recognise that the speaker is communicating with *him*.

UNDERSTANDING. Though Grice specifies the conditions for an utterance to mean something, he does not say anything about understanding an utterance. Strawson suggests that the speaker's utterance is understood by the hearer when the speaker's intention (i_4) is fulfilled.

This may connect to Austin's notion of securing an uptake (reception) of an illocutionary act. Securing uptake is securing understanding of the illocutionary force of the utterance. Might, however, there not be cases where the speaker does not intend the act to be understood by anyone? Well, we should say of such cases that at least the *aim* of securing uptake is a standard characteristic of the performance of illocutionary acts.

SHOWING OFF AND INSINUATING. An act has a nonnatural meaning when it produces an effect in the audience through a very particular route: by a recognition of the actor's intention, and a further recognition of the intention that the first recognition should occur. That is why the actor (speaker) may deploy various means to make his intentions clear. The formulae 'I warn you', 'I command you' etc. are exactly such formulae.

But now, is it the case that every illocutionary act can be made explicit? And is it the case that a verbal illocutionary act generally is 'what we do in saying what we say'? Austin's answer to these questions is yes to first and no to second. We can see this with the cases of showing off and insinuation.

When we show off, we intend to produce an effect in the audience. But its production in no way should go through a recognition of our intention to show off (that recognition would in fact hinder the production of the effect, likely lead to an opposite effect). Still, it may be that our 'main intention', so to speak, was to show off. Then does the effect of showing off constitute part of what is said? The current analysis gives us a systematic reason why not. It is our intention that the response of the hearer would be, say, to love us. This intention is part of (i_1). But the uptake is not secured through the recognition of (i_1). Rather, it is secured through the recognition of (i_2). So, in other words, we have a systematic reason to separate between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects.

Insinuation is another interesting case. Here we observe that every illocutionary act can be made explicit ('is avowable'). But insinuation is exactly the act that can be *disavowed*. The intention of the speaker, for the insinuation to be successful, must remain covert, to some extent.