LENIN AND BENDERIN. Benderin knew who Lenin was. He may have not known who Newton was, but Lenin is a different matter. Even so, when he met Lenin in the wood, he didn't know that Lenin was Lenin. But no, wait: that thing he must have known, because:

> Lenin is Lenin (0-1)

is a trivial proposition, and Benderin was not stupid. So what is it that he didn't know? Perhaps this:

> Lenin is the bald man yonder. (0-2)

So Benderin knew who Lenin was, but he didn't know every fact about him. In particular, he didn't know how exactly he looked, or where he was located on a particular day. Then back to the first statement: did Benderin actually know who Lenin was if he was ignorant about all these and other facts about Lenin?

Since our subject is philosophy of language, let us talk about all of this as a chapter in this subject. We can say: by knowing who Lenin was, Benderin knew how to use the name 'Lenin'. This seems true: suppose I ask you, do you know how to use the name 'Martov'? You are likely to have no idea. That is because you don't know who Martov is. Not knowing who he is, how can you use the name for him?

So the capacity of using the name seems be the same as the knowledge of who the bearer is. Or we could put again differently: to know what the name *means* is to know how to use it (what else is there to meaning?). And since to know how to use the name is to know who the bearer is, we conclude: the meaning of the name is the bearer of that name.

This view seems strange, though. How can a man (or a river, or a city) be the *meaning* of anything? Would you say:

> Look, here comes Lenin, the meaning of the word 'Lenin'? (0-3)

This sounds mildly offensive. Perhaps secret police will get in touch with you. So instead maybe we should say: names have no meaning whatever. They are quite unique in this of course, but no worries. Yet they refer to (designate, denote) objects. This is their linguistic function.

Yet this view does not seem right either. If you seriously think that, then you should say that a sentence like (0-2) is the same as:

> Qsus ghsysk is the bald man yonder. (0-4)

If names have no meaning, you can replace them with any nonsensical expression. Clearly this is wrong: (0-2) is meaningful, but (0-4) is not. You might protest: the expression 'Qsus ghsysk' has no obvious reference, let alone reference to Lenin, but the name 'Lenin' does have it. Very well; but you didn't explain how meaning and reference are related. Unless you have done that, I am entitled to go back and forth between (0-2) and (0-4).

ERNEST AND JACK. We ended up a little stuck in thinking about Lenin and Benderin, but we might do better thinking about Ernest. Actually, Wilde's brilliant comedy is a rich source of the philosophy of language insights, but we only focus on two episodes.

First, about Gwendolen. What does she know? She knows that:

> Jack is Jack. (0-5)

Yet Jack is actually Ernest. So the sentence:

> Jack is Ernest (0-6)

is equivalent to the sentence (0-5).

Question 1. Give a reason for this equivalence.

But of course Gwendolen didn't know that Jack was Ernest. This is a more rigorous argument for thinking that names do not just refer, but also possess some kind of meaning (which Gwendolen was unaware of), and that meaning and reference are intimately related (because Gwendolen also didn't know that 'Ernest' and 'Jack' refer to the same person).

Jumping to the end of the play, Ernest/Jack claims that he had always spoken truth. He means that when, for example, he said:

I am Ernest, (0-7)

he spoke the truth. This is because, unbeknownst to him, 'Ernest' referred to *him*, and of course he was himself. Actually, less confusing would be to consider Gwendolen again when, e.g., she says (before things are revealed):

Ernest is a darling. (0-8)

Now we thought she was deceived, and that there must be some fact of ignorance that Gwendolen is a victim of. Yet, as things seem to appear, miraculously she is saved from ignorance, and her utterance (0-8) turns out true. This does not seem too convincing. For example, someone may have known that *that man* is called 'Ernest', so that this person would have been entitled to assert truthfully the sentence (0-8). Since Gwendolen at this point doesn't know this, she says something false. Still, it is not clear what exactly is this that she doesn't know and that makes her utterance false.

YSB