

**REFORMULATING QUINE'S ARGUMENT.** If we accept behaviourist premisses, then meaning consists in a pattern of stimuli and responses. There may be some neural mechanism mediating between stimuli and responses, but it is inessential for the theory of meaning: any medium would do the job just as well. So the behaviourist does not deny there are, or could be, mental states. He only thinks they are unimportant in the account of meaning.

But this view, Searle argues, is incredible from the start. We know that there is a difference between meaning 'rabbit' and 'undetached rabbit part', even when there are identical stimuli-response patterns. Hence there will be indefinitely many translations consistent with the evidence, on one hand, but on the other hand, there must be a fact of the matter, a 'part of objective reality', that 'There is a rabbit' and 'There is an undetached rabbit-part' mean different things.

Searle, therefore, sees the indeterminacy of translation argument as a *reductio ad absurdum* of behaviourism. If we start with behaviourist premisses and pursue them consistently, we end up with an absurdity. If only we are allowed to use the first-person perspective, to cite as evidence the fact that I know what I mean when I say 'A rabbit!', then the argument simply shows the inadequacy of linguistic behaviourism.

**SAMENESS OF MEANING.** Quine's argument cannot simply consist in rejecting the existence of meaning in addition to stimuli-response patterns. That rejection was taken for granted from the start. The real argument is rather that, given behaviourist evidence—i.e. observations of stimuli-response patterns—there can be a unique correct translation. That is, the issue is whether there is a fact of sameness of meaning, once behaviourism is accepted. 128

At this point we have to consider Chomsky's argument again. There we see the complaint that Quine's argument is a mere argument for under-determination—a relatively trivial claim (in Chomsky's eyes). But this works only if there is a level of psychological facts accounting for meaning, that is, only if behaviourism is rejected from the start.

Since Quine, however, affirms it from the start, Chomsky's argument is a misconstrual. Two radical translation manuals are supposed to be compatible with the exactly same distribution of matter. They are physically equivalent, as Quine says. This is possible only if behaviourism is assumed. Therefore, it is wrong to think that Quine's argument establishes non-reality of psychological meanings. Far from it: for it to succeed, this non-reality has to be taken for granted.

**INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE.** At this point it is worth recalling the Fregean claim: sense determines reference. If the indeterminacy of translation is true, then, Searle argues, there will be no fact of the matter *for me* whether in using 'rabbit' I refer to rabbit or a rabbit-part. 128

But now, Searle insists, the absurdity of this conclusion is evident. For if this were the case, then I would not be able to make sense of the argument to begin with. I would not be able to understand the (surprisingly) equal correctness of the translation of 'rabbit' and 'rabbit-part' if I have not already had a conception of the difference of meaning of those two expressions. 131