

**THE MAIN ARGUMENT HAS A FALSE PREMISS?** The Main Argument is directed primarily at those who believe in free will, at least in the free will of an action like sitting. Then *these* theorists should find (1) false. Why? 39

(1) Jones has no choice about:  $\llbracket \text{JONES SITS AT } t \rrbracket$  was true a thousand years ago.

Merricks' objection is rather compressed. Every proposition is either true or false (bivalence). Suppose that we believe that Jones is freely choosing whether to sit at  $t$ , and that he actually chooses to sit at  $t$ . Then we ask: was  $\llbracket \text{JONES SITS AT } t \rrbracket$  true a thousand years ago? Well, plainly it was. But this means that he did have a free choice about the truth of  $\llbracket \text{JONES SITS AT } t \rrbracket$  a thousand years ago. 39–40

Fischer and Todd consider this objection also briefly. Their criticism appeals to the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' facts that originates with Ockham (under a modern interpretation). Hard facts are temporally non-relational, soft facts are temporally relational. So we can say that (1) was true a thousand years ago, if indeed it was, because of some hard fact existing a thousand years ago. But if so, then the past is fixed in exactly the sense required by the fatalist, and Jones can't choose freely to sit at  $t$ . 102

As Fischer and Todd also observe, the fatalist need not reject 'Truism'. He need only insist on its proper application. That is, if a proposition  $\llbracket \text{JONES SITS AT } t \rrbracket$  was true at  $t$ , then 'Truism' requires that some hard fact  $\mathfrak{F}$  also existed at  $t$  to explain the proposition's truth. But then Jones has no choice over sitting at  $t$ : to have such a choice means to be able to change  $\mathfrak{F}$ . But to be able to do so means to change a hard fact about the past—an impossibility. 114

The same sort of distinction may be used to block the question-beggingness objection. . .

**FOREKNOWLEDGE.** We begin with a thesis parallel to 'Truism': 51

*Origenism.* The truth of a propositional belief  $B_P$  depends on (is determined by): how things are with regard to  $P$  (?? the case that  $P$ ?? the world described by  $P$ ??)

Therefore, we can also say:

'No choice.' Having no choice over  $B$ 's truth presupposes having no choice about the 'truthmaker' of  $B$ .

Consider now the Lucky Guess argument. Let Smith believe that Jones sits at  $t$ . Then: 50

- (4) Jones has no choice about: Smith's belief  $B$  was true ten years ago.
- (5) Necessarily, if Smith's belief  $B$  was true ten years ago, then Jones sits at  $t$ .
- (3) Therefore, Jones has no choice about sitting at  $t$ .

But because of 'No choice', this argument is question-begging.

Similarly for the Divine Foreknowledge argument: 51

- (6) Jones has no choice about: God believed  $\llbracket \text{JONES SITS AT } t \rrbracket$  a thousand years ago.
- (7) Necessarily, if God believed  $\llbracket \text{JONES SITS AT } t \rrbracket$  a thousand years ago, then Jones sits at  $t$ .
- (3) Jones has no choice about: Jones' sitting at  $t$ .

The key move is to recognise, together with Origen, that God's beliefs depend on the world. This is another manifestation of (Truism).

But Fischer and Todd raise the following objection. If God knew (had a belief) that  $P$  a thousand years ago, then God was in a certain mental state a thousand years ago. So this was a fact about the world a thousand years ago, and it was not a relational, 'soft' fact. But if so, then by choosing not to sit at  $t$  Jones would change a hard fact about the past—namely, God's mental state a thousand years ago. 103