

Remark 1. Numbers on the margins indicate paragraph numbers in Hobbes' text.

Remark 2. The symbols '□' and '◇' stand for 'necessarily' and 'possibly', respectively.

DELIBERATION AND WILL. We begin with voluntary actions. These are actions (or outward motions) that are caused by a desire (=appetite). Every desire is a representation of ('thought of') some good or bad that will come to the agent. In this sense, every action is aimed at the agent's good, as it appears to him. We can also say, and more in line with traditional approaches (Aristotle), that voluntary actions follow a deliberation on the agent's part. But that's because deliberation is nothing but a 'succession of contrary appetites'. 25

Now 'voluntary' actions are those that are done 'willingly'. But what is will? It's nothing but the last desire prior to the action—i.e. the last in the succession of desires that constitutes deliberation. This, Hobbes argues, is equivalent to saying that voluntary actions are a result of the agent's choice. 27

So to take stock: every action that we would normally describe as such would qualify as a voluntary one. OK, but what are the involuntary actions? Elsewhere Hobbes implies that, e.g., digestion would be considered an involuntary action. Of course we don't normally describe them as 'actions' to begin with, but sometimes we do: 'He was now digesting his dinner.' (Aristotle gave examples of men pushed or carried, though this doesn't seem to be the cases Hobbes has in mind.) 28

FREEDOM. Hobbes defines freedom as absence of obstacles. Thus we have freedom of action—i.e. freedom of outward motion. So we can speak, in exactly the same way, of the freedom of a man and of the freedom of water. 29

But is there free will? Gammon, says Hobbes. Everything in the world has a cause. Now if will is just another desire (itself a form of inward motion, as he explains elsewhere), then will too is determined by its own causes, hence 'necessitated'. 30, 32

HOBBS' REASONS. As for the notions of will and deliberation, we require no special proof. We need only to reflect on the common usage of words. Conveniently, he doesn't say exactly how this reflection would go. 33

More curious is his defence of the necessity of causal determination. First, in the dice example, he seems to say that, if only we saw well and reflected more carefully, we would see that every minute detail of every event has its own sufficient cause, always so. 34

But then he moves on to something else altogether. Consider: 34

(2-1) It will rain or it will not rain.

This, all agree, is a necessary proposition. So:

(2-2) Necessarily, it will rain or it will not rain (but not both).

Now Hobbes claims that (2-2) can't be true unless either of the conjuncts is necessarily true. Thus, in general, he argues that:

(2-3) $\Box(P \vee Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \vee \Box Q)$.

But this is an invalid formula! Hobbes acknowledges doubts about (2-3), but professes himself unperturbed.

Question 3. Explain why (2-3) is intuitively invalid.

Remark 4. Note too that these related formulas *are* intuitively valid:

- (2-4) a. $(\Box P \vee \Box Q) \rightarrow \Box(P \vee Q)$
b. $\Diamond(P \vee Q) \leftrightarrow (\Diamond P \vee \Diamond Q)$.