

THE NOTION OF BULLSHIT. Frankfurt focusses on the figure of bullshitter, rather than on the his utterance *per se*. The bullshitter is unconcerned with the truth of what he says. His primary goal is to manipulate the audience. This unconcern connects him to the figure of wanton (below).

CARE AND DESIRE. Freedom, including political freedom, is often understood as the ability to do what you want (desire). But as many people, at least since Plato, have observed, getting what you want won't necessarily make you happy. The problem was traditionally connected to the fact of ignorance. It may be that satisfying your desire may result in some form of pain or disappointment that you have failed to foresee, or perhaps chose to ignore owing to the weakness of your will.

Frankfurt identifies a further problem with this alignment of desire satisfaction and happiness. Not every desire is relevant for happiness. What counts is satisfaction or frustration of 'important' desires. We need to care about the object of desire for its satisfaction to contribute to our happiness. In fact, if a creature is incapable of ranking (perhaps implicitly) its desires into important and unimportant—if it is incapable of caring—then it is incapable of being happy. The concept of happiness doesn't apply to it.

Caring for *X* is also different from valuing *X*, even valuing it for its own sake. Sensory pleasure (or enjoyment) is usually understood as being valuable for its own sake. It is strange to ask, 'What is the purpose of enjoying a cake?' Yet with many such pleasures, I don't particularly care for them. They are too insignificant.

CARE EXPLICATED. What makes a desire insignificant is that it is fleeting. Sure, right now I want a cake. But if you offer me an ice-cream, this will do, too. I will forget all about the cake and my desire for it. It is opposite with care. To care for *X* is to sustain my desire for *X* for a period of time, especially after satisfying a competing desire for *Y*.

To care for *X* is also not to be stuck with a desire for it. I may obsess over *X* without, so to speak, endorsing my obsession. That's the case of an unwilling addict. Instead, you have to be committed to *X*, to the pursuit of it. Of course, also in this case we can say that you are 'addicted'. But this would be an instance of a *willing* addict. There are, then, generally three figures to consider: a willing addict, an unwilling addict, and a wanton. A wanton is an addict with no particular attitude toward his addiction: he neither endorses it, nor wishes to kick it. Of course, we can't say that he cares about the thing he's addicted too.

Care, then, is a form of commitment. It is more than a mere endorsement or approval. It involves a disposition to nurture the desire, to ensure that it is not extinguished. I think that this is a psychologically delicate point.

Example 1 (Caring about Mahler). Suppose that I care about Mahler's music. One day I discover that I don't really enjoy Mahler, or at least do not seek to hear this music. I may still 'approve' of Mahler and of the people who enjoy his music. But doing that is not enough for *caring* about that music. To care I also have to rekindle my desire. In this case in particular we can observe the hierarchy of first-order desires (desire for music) and of second-order desires or 'volitions' (desire to rekindle the desire).

CARE AND PERSONHOOD. Caring for *X* has a value going beyond the value of *X*. Its own intrinsic value is in shaping what we are, as selves. A person caring for nothing is worse off than a person caring for something worthless. The former is not properly a person. He is a wanton, akin to a lower animal who doesn't have a volitional structure characteristic of persons.

THE IDEA OF LOVE. On a common understanding, 'loving *X*' and 'caring for *X*' are closely aligned. It would be strange to say that you love *X*, but don't care about it, or that you care for *X*, but don't love it. As Frankfurt construes love, however, it is a specific form of caring focussed on the well-being of the beloved. The concern that the lover has for the well-being of the beloved is both not entirely within his control (volitional control) and also disinterested. The lover's concern is not a fleeting attitude. It shapes how the person tends to act, and how he manages his motivations.

As Frankfurt notes, it is problematic to locate love in human relationships. These relationships, if complex enough, are rarely disinterested. I may have a concern for you, but deep down, is it wholly for your own sake? Or may be it is, but then, can I sustain this concern for any period of time? I may generously give you a reference letter or a loan. The occurrent motive of self-interest may be absent, of course. But such actions should still be understood, plausibly, in a wider framework of reciprocities. I expect you, for example, to be grateful and express this gratitude in concrete terms later, if necessary. The relations with lower animals or inanimate or abstract objects would be better candidates for generating love in Frankfurt's sense.

LOVE AND DUTY. The key feature of love that makes it special in its own right and distinct from other motivations is its immediacy and particularity. In this it is crucially distinct from moral attitudes of the kind we see in deontology and utilitarianism.

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